the difference between secondary qualities and morals are that secondary qualities are matters of sense data. The intersubjectivity of morality in no way suggests it is discovered rather than created.
Atheism (Do you believe in God? If yes, then why?)
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the difference between secondary qualities and morals are that secondary qualities are matters of sense data. The intersubjectivity of morality in no way suggests it is discovered rather than created.
like Hume I have never heard anyone explain what 'obligation' means, what 'ought' refers to, or how they explain the 'ought.' Even if I were to say 'morals depend on us' I can't imagine why that means we 'ought' protect them, why it would be tragic that morals no longer existed after a meteor obliterated the Earth killing their host (us).
indeed we may discover humans have a survival mechanism, but does that mean man 'ought' not be a police officer or soldier, for he is obligated to do what best aids his immediate survival? I don't see how discovering morals ever discovers a obligation to them.
Cythraul
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- Dec 10, 2003
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The second point does not follow from the first. The only thing that follows is that if consciousness did not exist, the term "existence" would not be in usage because there would be no language. You are smuggling in this notion that our language or our concepts can't track extra-linguistic or extra-conceptual truths. But this does not follow from the fact that "existence" or any other term for that matter was first defined by consciousness. In fact, suppose there are two stimulation equivalent scenarios S1 and S2. In S1 my position is true and your position is false. In S2 my position is false and your position is true. If they are stimulation equivalent then there is nothing to prove my position true or false, and likewise for your position. Your position is unverifiable. Like I said before, the notion of things existing is LOGICALLY CONSISTENT with the notion of the absence of human consciousness.
Once again, you are smuggling in the notion that our concepts don't track extra-conceptual truth. The truth of this claim is radically underdetermined by the data. Care to give me an argument for this claim?
I'm sorry but I find the above passage completely unintelligible. You need to understand that I don't read the same things that you read.
If existence is impossible without consciousness then you'd have to maintain that consciousness exists. You would have to take consciousness as a value of your variables otherwise the claim that existence is impossible without consciousness is senseless if you think that things exist. But now you'd have to say that the existence of consciousness depends upon the existence of consciousness, yet I find the notion that something can be logically or temporally prior to itself unintelligible.
edit: expanding upon that last point, you have a few options here. You might say that the existence of consciousness is impossible without the existence of consciousness. That however, is false. Something can be possible without being actual. Or you might say that consciousness doesn't exist unless it exists. That however is trivial and obvious. The real difficulty here is in the claim that existence is impossible without the existence of consciousness. But how is the existence of consciousness possible?
I don't think we disagree about whether or not it is possible that moral principles depend for their existence on human beings and we have obligations to nevertheless abide by them. In describing this possibility I did not say that either of these conjuncts hold because of the other (i.e. I did not say anything which implicated that if moral principles ontologically depend on human beings, then we are obliged to obey them.) Perhaps, you see no reason to think that possibility is realized, and but in your post you seem to only address the issue about the explanatory relation between the conjuncts (by saying that "Even if I were to say 'morals depend on us' I can't imagine why that means we 'ought' protect them").
to clarify, I think we agree its possble moral princples depend on man to exist, but I don't at all agree we have any obligations, least of all to them. if obligation meant determinism I'd agree, but if obligation is 'choosing to do something because it is your duty to do it' (But it otherwise could be chosen not to be done) then I don't. in other words, we are ontologically 'obligated' to breath, in that sense, but I wouldn't say we have a moral obligation, a duty which we are free to not do and should take action to make sure we do, which seems to be why most people mean by obligation, especially since Kant, for instance, said morality must involve a struggle against oneself.
what's the way in which you'd use the word? and can you not keep in the equation the possibility of morals which we have no duty to follow but nonetheless exist, as color may exist but we have no duty to open our eyes.
I take moral principles to be sentences of the forms:
It is permissible/obligatory that P
or
It ought to be the case that P
(where P could be any sentence, eg. "noone is killed", or "John wears his shoes" etc.)
Some sentences of this form, we take to be false, eg. "It ought to be the case that 2+2=5" because the embedded sentence is impossible. Other sentences, we take to be false because they seem to be false even if the embedded sentence is possible, eg. "It is obligatory that John ties his shoe" (think of a scenario where John's act has no moral relevance).
Now, one might maintain that there are no true sentences of this form, and thereby deny that there are any true moral principles. I believe that is your view. I understand you to be saying that it is not clear what these sentences really mean and that they may indeed be senseless if they cannot be explained in categorical terms. In that case it would follow that they could not be truly saying anything either.
The latter part of this view strikes me as incorrect. We can appreciate that these statements are meaningful. There can be no general requirement that we should be able to explain what a term means in a non-circular manner using expressions which do not implicit depend on their intelligibility on the terms in question. There is also no good reason to expect that the requirement holds in the case of "ought". There is no explanation of "ought" in merely categorical terms, but that may not mean that ought-statements (i.e. moral principles, as I understand them) are meaningless.
It could of course still be that ought-sentences are meaningful but none of them are true. This also appears to me to be false (we take some such sentences to be true and I see no reason to doubt appearances here) but I will not discuss this (major) issue now.
Rather, I want to remark that if moral principles are sentences of the forms I mentioned above, then it is not possible for there to be any moral principles we are not obligated to follow. This is because the content of a moral principle just is that things turn out to be a certain way. If we are moral agents, then we ought to bring it about that things are that way. Of course, we may deny that human beings are moral agents in that sense (i.e. agents that ought to bring it about that P if it ought to be that P), but this assumption does not appear implausible.
In sum, it is of course correct that colors may exist, and yet we don't have an obligation to open our eyes. But if true moral principles exist (true sentences of the above forms), then we have an obligation to bring about certain things.
It is permissible/obligatory that P
or
It ought to be the case that P
(where P could be any sentence, eg. "noone is killed", or "John wears his shoes" etc.)
Some sentences of this form, we take to be false, eg. "It ought to be the case that 2+2=5" because the embedded sentence is impossible. Other sentences, we take to be false because they seem to be false even if the embedded sentence is possible, eg. "It is obligatory that John ties his shoe" (think of a scenario where John's act has no moral relevance).
Now, one might maintain that there are no true sentences of this form, and thereby deny that there are any true moral principles. I believe that is your view. I understand you to be saying that it is not clear what these sentences really mean and that they may indeed be senseless if they cannot be explained in categorical terms. In that case it would follow that they could not be truly saying anything either.
The latter part of this view strikes me as incorrect. We can appreciate that these statements are meaningful. There can be no general requirement that we should be able to explain what a term means in a non-circular manner using expressions which do not implicit depend on their intelligibility on the terms in question. There is also no good reason to expect that the requirement holds in the case of "ought". There is no explanation of "ought" in merely categorical terms, but that may not mean that ought-statements (i.e. moral principles, as I understand them) are meaningless.
It could of course still be that ought-sentences are meaningful but none of them are true. This also appears to me to be false (we take some such sentences to be true and I see no reason to doubt appearances here) but I will not discuss this (major) issue now.
Rather, I want to remark that if moral principles are sentences of the forms I mentioned above, then it is not possible for there to be any moral principles we are not obligated to follow. This is because the content of a moral principle just is that things turn out to be a certain way. If we are moral agents, then we ought to bring it about that things are that way. Of course, we may deny that human beings are moral agents in that sense (i.e. agents that ought to bring it about that P if it ought to be that P), but this assumption does not appear implausible.
In sum, it is of course correct that colors may exist, and yet we don't have an obligation to open our eyes. But if true moral principles exist (true sentences of the above forms), then we have an obligation to bring about certain things.
I'm not sure why you say 'permissible/obligatory' here.
that something is 'allowed' has no relation to that it is 'required' (to use synonyms)
it should be more like
It is permissible that P
It is obligatory(/It ought to be the case) that P
I'm 'permitted' to drink coffee, but I am not 'obligated', -- i can't say 'I'm permitted/obligated to drink coffee'
it is only if I am obligated to drink coffee that I 'ought,' and that I legally or morally 'can' doesn't mean I 'ought.'
a moral principle may be 'thou shall not kill' but a soldier 'ought' disobey it. the moral principle isn't coextensive with a command to obey it, even if the soldier grants that as a good principle, he doesn't feel obligated to obey it, as I agree an apple a day is a good principle, but again there is no justification to force me to eat an apple every day simply because I accept that it's good for me.
sure, but if you correct your first statement about rights, then that 'its permissible for you to drink alcohol' doesn't obligate you to any action---it no where says 'you are obligated to use your freedom to drink or not to drink alcohol, to drink alcohol.'
for a time, in America, it sodomy wasn't permissible, but obviously that didn't have anyone obligated to follow it. I don't know where you get the idea of obligation from, even in an 'ought' statement, the 'ought' is the obligation and you haven't explained why someone 'ought.' we 'ought' not kill? why? at least 'its not permissible to kill' is an answer, 'your ought not sodomize, because it is not permissible' is an answer, but there is no moral justification here any more than 'you ought not keep more than 14 slaves' was moral simply if it were a law. the ought comes from nowhere
a moral principle says 'you can defend yourself when someone tries to rape you' but does that mean you were immoral---you didn't do what you 'ought'---if you were paralysed with fear or chose not to resist not wanting to make them more violent when that happened? I don't think a good suggestion or an inclination is an obligation
ÎÏεβοÏ
Member
Prove? I was simply explaining why I would choose Varg over a misguided nice old lady, not trying to prove anything to you [as I know it would be basically impossible to get through that thick fundy skull of yours]. How about you prove to me that your way is better, oh all-wise one?
I would kill every human being on this planet if I could if it meant preventing this world from being fucked up. Our species is no more important than any other, certainly not more important than the overall whole. We should be caretakers of this planet and its ecosystem, not what we are now. No one has an absolute right to life, it is in no way infringing on "rights" to let nature take its course and kill off people in overpopulated areas through starvation, but not letting this occur is overstepping our bounds as a part of nature.
I thought my intention in using "permissible/obligatory" was clear enough. "It is obligatory/permissible that P" is used as an abbreviation for two sentences "It is obligatory that P" and "It is permissible that P".
no moral principle is co-extensive with a command, since moral principles can be true or false, but a command cannot properly be said to have a truth value.
more importantly, the soldier example at most shows that "it ought to be the case that noone kills a human being" is not a true moral principle as stated. if one really thinks that a person (eg. a soldier) is permitted to kill in some (conjuction of) circumstances C, then the correct principle will be "it ought to be the case that noone kills a human being unless C holds". the soldier example therefore does not lead one to think that ought-statements do not oblige people to do certain things.
permissive moral principles ("ıt is permissible that P") do not demand any action by an agent. whereas mandatory moral principles ("it is obligatory that P" or "it ought to be that P") demand that the world be a certain way (the way described by the embedded sentence "P"). if the world is already as P says it is, then there need be nothing that an agent actively does in order to obey the moral principle. but if the world is not as P describes it, then an agent will have to actively bring it about that P.
i have no good answer to the question about the ultimate ground of the truth of certain moral principles. i am inclined to say that they are basic and cannot be explained using morally neutral concepts. but this is a big question and i don't think that we can only accept that there are some true moral principles unless we have an explanation of the truth of any true moral principle from morally neutral concepts (which is what i believe you were asking for).
i think it is clear enough that there are some true moral principles, but which moral principles are true is another question. the examples concerning sodomy and slavery above do not show that there are no moral truths, but only that what were commonly believed to be moral truths were actually false. seeing what moral principles are the true ones is a very difficult feat, but it is irrelevant to our purposes here. we are only concerned with the question about the existence of true moral principles and with whether or not we are obligated to follow what is said by true ought-statements.
Suppose "it is permissible that P" is true. Now, if an agent does not bring about that P, should we think that he has done something wrong? No. Permissibility statements tell one what one can do, and not what one ought to do. In the case at hand, if the person does not defend herself, she has not failed an obligation even if she is not paralyzed etc. I have not said anything that I believe implied the contrary.
Norsemaiden
barbarian
Population control imposed by the West on the third world seems to be the humanitarian solution you suggest. Clearly this would be decried as being racist. Simply failing to feed anyone foreign at least should avoid that accusation.
THE INHERENT RACISM OF POPULATION CONTROL
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1138109/posts
i can't say i follow your point. population control is presumably desired by the people who are suffering in poor regions, not really something imposed from outside. the rest of the world is there to help a solution that is found together with those people, not impose a solution on them. i don't see any racism in that.
edit: i took a brief look at the paper posted at the site that was linked above, but i am really not convinced by the conspiracy theory it advocates. in any case, even if the paper is right, what matters is not whatever beliefs malthus might have had back in the day about the inferiority of the poor and what motives other people might have had in supporting some form of population control. what matters is whether or not overpopulation is a problem in some areas of the world today and whether or not something should be done to solve it.
edit: i took a brief look at the paper posted at the site that was linked above, but i am really not convinced by the conspiracy theory it advocates. in any case, even if the paper is right, what matters is not whatever beliefs malthus might have had back in the day about the inferiority of the poor and what motives other people might have had in supporting some form of population control. what matters is whether or not overpopulation is a problem in some areas of the world today and whether or not something should be done to solve it.
ÎÏεβοÏ
Member
The only working solution is to allow the natural mechanisms to work, we can't come up with anything that nears the perfect balance of nature, and trying has only made things worse. There is no solution to be "found together with those people." The solution is already there, and we do nothing but fight that solution it seems.
maybe we need a separate population control thread to discuss the necessity and morality of those kinds of things
I may as well explain why that confused me before I reply.
you wrote
to me this seemed to say there were two kinds of forms:
'form a'
or
'form b'
...but when I asked about obligation/ought, you've clarified that you actually said,
principles are sentences of the forms:
'a or b' (a/b)
or
'b'
so if by 'X is permissible/obligated' you meant 'these are the two forms' I'm not sure why you didn't completely double up and say
'X is permissible/obligated'
or
'X is obligated'
or
'X is permissible'
(or why you didn't not double up at all of course, saying 'X is permissible' or 'X is obligated')
what is unclear is why you abbreviated the two sentences together and then noted one of the abreviated two as if it was in contrast to the first one.
so you are saying there can be no valid use of the word 'ought'?
from whence does an ought statement derive its authority? i guess that's my main concern. Indeed I can say you ought let me kill you, I have a moral principle saying its okay for -some group which you're excluded from and I'm in- to kill people excluded from my group. Where is the authority in my ought statement?
technicially the agent must act to avoid the end of P (e.g., 'P = world peace,' one must avoid conflict, you have to actively restrain your desires to obey it)
as a moral nihilist I'd like it if you'd give example to that point, since though I agree on a kind of morality, I don't believe 'thou shalt not rape/kill/steal/covet' etc. are 'true moral principles,' so I'm curious which kind you're thinking by that term (since many people use it simply for laws they think are universal because they are universalized)
if no true moral statements can be found then it is relevant because it suggests perhaps they don't exist, and since none have been found none 'ought' be obeyed since surely some authority of the 'ought' comes from the fact they're true, and so even if we think 'oughts' are justified, we have no 'oughts' to follow until some 'true' moral principles are found.
Belief in the Pagan gods, the religion of christianity was invented as a tool of opression, by the romans.
Dominick_7
Member
I apologize if it was confusing to you. If I may ask, why do you think things exist? In other words, why is there something rather than nothing at all?
Dominick_7
Member
Why? Are you saying that you believe that all existence is self explaining and necessary, thus doesnt need a causing agent? If all of existence is not self explaining and necesary, thus something that exists needs a cause, how would it not need a causing agent?
Dominick_7
Member
lol this reminds me of something I heard about the sophists in a lecture on Socrates.
if I find it soon I'll post it up, cos it's hilarious how he talks about this childish logic which before Socrates dealt with them they could otherwise be like greasy lawyers and get away with.
edit: found it. 2mb download. 10 minutes long. very amusing
YouSendIt: The Leader in File Delivery.
While there probebly is no point in replying to this, why do you think its sophistry to make a distinction between truth and logic, IE actual truth vs logical possibility? Or between the fact that while one can formally state something doesnt mean it can be meaningfully affirmed as true without self destructing?
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