I think Justins’ astute realisation that we must have a conception of what ‘man’ is before we ascertain the value of claims to any innate ‘worth’ he possesses provides an excellent foundation for considering this thread.
Here are some very rough and rambling thoughts. I apologise for their unpolished presentation. Time constraints prevent me from fleshing this out into a coherent piece.
It is quite interesting to consider what has been made of the notion of ‘man’ historically. If we examine Kipling’s ‘If,’ for example, it would seem that ‘man’ is almost a task to perform. According to the poem, a person is NOT innately a man – that title is conditional to fulfilling the behavioural duty outlined in the stanzas. I think Kipling’s man reflected what in the English vernacular became the
gentle man. It is this performative man that is often assigned respect, and (moral) rights. It is this perfomative man against which one is judged in the courts.
I think that this notion of conditional man is reflected across a spectrum of ideological thought. A ‘man’ is he that performs the tasks of allegiance necessary for subscription to an ideology, or theology, or morality. You might argue that Christ's love, perhaps, is distinct because - in the words of Desmond Tutu - 'all, all, ALL are embraced,' but presumably this embrace is to little avail unless 'man' fulfils the obligation of penitence.
The word ‘moral’ needs some clarification, but it seems that judgements of man’s worth are quite common. 'Self' seems to be invested with value either by a deontological external – God, for example - , or invests its own value in willed experience. It seems that when this valuating process aligns with a posited external – an abstract universal ideal, for example – , what might be called the moral worth of man is revealed quite strikingly. The ‘nihilist’ might posit a strongly negative moral worth of man; the theist a high positive. Perhaps the scientist might view man as a collection of molecules striving to propagate his genes and ascribe 'moral' worth in accordance to a perceived beauty in that process.
When man’s worth is revealed through his own invested experience (his existentially posited values), it seems to me that ascetic ‘moral’ worth is dispensed in favour of worth in accordance with experiential compatibility. That is, the hedonist ‘values’ man as a tool for obtaining pleasure. 'Pleasure' is the condition which one must fulfil to be considered ‘man.’ Pleasure is what man IS. However, as Sartre noted, it is also exactly what man is NOT. The reflective ‘for-itself’ of man’s consciousness is the nothingness of what he is not. That is, when man reflects ‘I am happy,’ the point from which this evaluation is undertaken (the ‘I’ that posits ‘I am happy’
is NOT itself ‘happy;’ it is that which stands outside of happiness and evaluates it. For Sartre, we live in an existentialist age, in which for many God is dead, and the nothingness of the for-itself reads its own values into life, revealing our Being. This evaluatory nothingness is the existentialist’s replacement for God.
My opinion? I think there are serious problems with many of the above notions of man. ‘Man’ is not a material object. Man is a way of being. Man is Dasein. Dasein is not biological, but ontological. To ascribe no innate ‘value’ to Dasein would indeed be a catastrophic nihilism and – if such a thing were really possible – represent the eradication of Being. Dasein shepherds Being into the World. In this way man is ‘Godded’ before he needs recourse to reflective experience. In this way he is able to ‘own’ his own death: to understand it as a necessary tenet of his ontological condition. He is, as Nietzche might say, ‘beyond good and evil.’
The Being of man is not for moral disposure.
There is a disclosed moral dignity of Being to being man or woman.