zabu of nΩd
Free Insultation
- Feb 9, 2007
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The Whining and Bitching Thread
- Thread starter waif
- Start date
Dak
mentat
Far as I know he committed suicide because he moved halfway across the US for some broad and the relationship fell through.
Zephyrus
Tyrants and Slaves
Realizing I must have built up an unhealthy caffeine addiction over the past month or so due to the my summer job. I was drinking a lot more coffee than I was used to, as well as downing Full Throttles and Red Bulls multiple times a week (almost at a rate of one per day).
But now I think it's taking its toll, since unless I'm supercharged full of that stuff then my attention span becomes that of a gold fish, I can't think deeply or creatively, and I'm in a perpetual fog. I wish I could have the awesome thoughts I used to have, but instead my brain defaults to either total silence or random song lyrics.
I want to think it's the caffeine, but I think it's a trend that began much earlier this year. Not being in school and not being handed to me a structure of academic rigor has made me less sharp, less organized, less engaged. It's like I don't care about anything anymore. And what's making it worse is that I'm paranoid that this will cause me to be a major failure once I start grad school in a couple weeks. I'm hoping that getting back into that routine will sharpen me up again, but I think it will be a very rough transition to say the least.
It really sucks when I read, as I can feel I'm not absorbing or retaining the information nearly as well.
I need to get my brain back into shape.
But now I think it's taking its toll, since unless I'm supercharged full of that stuff then my attention span becomes that of a gold fish, I can't think deeply or creatively, and I'm in a perpetual fog. I wish I could have the awesome thoughts I used to have, but instead my brain defaults to either total silence or random song lyrics.
I want to think it's the caffeine, but I think it's a trend that began much earlier this year. Not being in school and not being handed to me a structure of academic rigor has made me less sharp, less organized, less engaged. It's like I don't care about anything anymore. And what's making it worse is that I'm paranoid that this will cause me to be a major failure once I start grad school in a couple weeks. I'm hoping that getting back into that routine will sharpen me up again, but I think it will be a very rough transition to say the least.
It really sucks when I read, as I can feel I'm not absorbing or retaining the information nearly as well.
I need to get my brain back into shape.
damnromulans
Klingons do not faint
The Butt is Canadian.
Zeph, your brain is just starting to atrophy as you get older. IT'S ALL DOWNHILL FROM HERE.
I've been back in the USA for one year. Haven't left the North American continent once this year. Shit fucking sucks.
Zeph, your brain is just starting to atrophy as you get older. IT'S ALL DOWNHILL FROM HERE.
I've been back in the USA for one year. Haven't left the North American continent once this year. Shit fucking sucks.
monoxide_child
New Metal Member
- Jul 30, 2008
- 6,210
- 4
- 0
i don't think anyone cares...
but i fixed my problem
my roommate still doesn't want to live in a place with cheap rent, but he's agreed to let one of my friends move in with us so that we're splitting the rent/bills 3 ways instead of just 50/50
zabu of nΩd
Free Insultation
- Feb 9, 2007
- 14,620
- 805
- 113
I myself have heard rumors of people often slipping from their peak mental capabilities in the early 20s.
AllShallFall
Senior Member
. good luck with that shit!!
viewerfromnihil
Vein-Marbled Tower
I wouldn't sweat it Zeph, it's probably just the jitters. If you're smoking pot and drinking frequently, cutting back significantly would make a world of a difference.
Zephyrus
Tyrants and Slaves
I quite pot for good after MDF. I was smoking a lot of it this past Spring, and I think that might have been a factor.
The drinking has been at a lower rate, though when it does happen I'm less moderate than I should be.
I've realized that I don't do enough to keep my brain sharp, such as playing an instrument or having enough intellectual conversations with friends.
The drinking has been at a lower rate, though when it does happen I'm less moderate than I should be.
I've realized that I don't do enough to keep my brain sharp, such as playing an instrument or having enough intellectual conversations with friends.
damnromulans
Klingons do not faint
divine_torture
leVel
I never understood killing yourself for a broad (unless maybe you have been married 40 years and your old and she died of cancer or something). There's a kid from a town not far from here that just killed himself over his girlfriend leaving him. The kid was 14. Seriously?
SentinelSlain
Suck my joined date.
- Nov 21, 2007
- 10,015
- 153
- 63
I suppose it's understandable in some circumstances. Like if you're a major loser and you somehow score a 10 but she leaves you after a year or something.
divine_torture
leVel
But at that age there's still another 60 or 70 years of life left to live. A lot more can happen in that amount of time...
Jimmy... Dead.
contemplative curmudgeon
Zephyrus
Tyrants and Slaves
Some of Hegel's thought has made more sense to me lately.
I've noticed that I have what I'm terming the Muse Effect. It's when I sit down and start writing, ideas I wouldn't have thought of just by sitting and thinking suddenly pop into my head and are translated onto the page.
For example, most of today I wasn't having many great thoughts, but then I had to sit down and write up some student evaluations. It didn't take long to break a stride and stimulate my mind with my own writing.
I suppose that explains why my blog exists. Most of the ideas on it start either in germinal form or are otherwise ideas drawn from other philosophers and men of letters, but they develop mostly by the act of writing them out rather then having the whole blueprint in my head already. The argument is in the logos, I suppose, that which links the thought world to the sense world by way of symbols.
I've noticed that I have what I'm terming the Muse Effect. It's when I sit down and start writing, ideas I wouldn't have thought of just by sitting and thinking suddenly pop into my head and are translated onto the page.
For example, most of today I wasn't having many great thoughts, but then I had to sit down and write up some student evaluations. It didn't take long to break a stride and stimulate my mind with my own writing.
I suppose that explains why my blog exists. Most of the ideas on it start either in germinal form or are otherwise ideas drawn from other philosophers and men of letters, but they develop mostly by the act of writing them out rather then having the whole blueprint in my head already. The argument is in the logos, I suppose, that which links the thought world to the sense world by way of symbols.
Jimmy... Dead.
contemplative curmudgeon
I've never been able to really put deep thought into decent writing. I try making no assumptions about what divides the two but can't help but notice the structure of my thought never changes while my writing always seems different.
That's what makes me bring up Hegel. I believe he had a similar problem, which is why some people think his work is nonsense.
That's what makes me bring up Hegel. I believe he had a similar problem, which is why some people think his work is nonsense.
SomeGuyDude
My name is sorrow.
- Apr 26, 2011
- 2,159
- 1
- 36
I was told I was getting transferred at my job today, so I had to work double over the weekend (no pay, the client doesn't pay weekends) in order to get this project finished before I left. I was okay with it, because it was a priority project and the transfer is a damn good move up for me.
Well I go in to turn the shit in, and they tell me that not only do I not leave until the end of the week, but since I finished my shit early I can get more work to do until I go!
I'm planning on setting a record for most half-assed job in history for the next three days. QUARTER assed job.
Well I go in to turn the shit in, and they tell me that not only do I not leave until the end of the week, but since I finished my shit early I can get more work to do until I go!
I'm planning on setting a record for most half-assed job in history for the next three days. QUARTER assed job.
zabu of nΩd
Free Insultation
- Feb 9, 2007
- 14,620
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I dare say, you seem quite surprised by the workings of your mind sometimes. Neurochemistry much? And with the way you've presented to me your understanding of reality, I must ask: do you really anticipate reaching some grand conclusion about the nature of reality through your study of ancient philosophy, despite the overwhelming evidence that this imperfect tool of language we use is, and has long been, our best way of understanding ourselves and the world around us?
Why not just accept language and concepts for what they are, and focus more on maximizing our benefits from them?
zabu of nΩd
Free Insultation
- Feb 9, 2007
- 14,620
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- 113
Einherjar86
Active Member
Grant makes some really good points. I cannot help but make a lengthy and (hopefully) philosophically coordinated reply.
I've been thinking more about this lately, and while I still believe that in the ultimate course of history, different paradigms, epistemes, etc. will have different conceptions of reality or "being-in-the-world", I think that individuals living within those periods will be hardpressed to see their relation to the world as being conditioned or mediated by things like language and culture. We see this all the time today.
That said, it doesn't mean that people should just ignore the effects of our limited apperception of the world; however, if a sizable group, taking these limitations into account, were to somehow participate in an event of true philosophical rigor, I believe the common understanding drawn from its conclusion might suffice as a kind of "grand conclusion about the nature of reality."
This leads me into your next comment:
This attitude could be said to fit within a branch of 20th-century analytic philosophy known as pragmatism. Pragmatism draws a lot of influence from Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, even occasionally Foucault, and puts extraordinary emphasis on conceptual relativity, empiricism, and the idea that all discourses/arguments/discussions essentially boil down to language games. Our best practical approach, therefore, is to try and understand the language games, the instruments we use, the concepts, so as to better understand and facilitate our communicative faculties.
Coincidentally, I just read an essay by Alain Badiou that challenges this approach. Badiou accuses it of sophistry and claims that the current situation of analytic (and even much of continental) philosophy relies too much on the historical conditioning of philosophy up unto this point in time. He writes:
"For Nietzsche, as for Heidegger, all thought that claims to be philosophical must first of all be evaluated in a historical assemblage (montage); the mainspring of this historical assemblage is to be found with the Greeks; and the game is played, the consignment is sent, in what happens between the Presocratics and Plato."
Badiou calls for a radical breaking of philosophy from what he calls "historicism." This is difficult for me to accept, since I see history (or at least the contingency of historical moments) as the primary conditioner of any cultural milieu. However, I also see where Badiou is coming from: he wants to salvage philosophy as a genuine and legitimate search for the Absolute, for Truth, and his theoretical system is an attempt to provide the method for doing that.
On the surface, this might seem like a pseudo-totalitarian attempt at securing Truth based on whatever fallacious appeal might be at hand; but Badiou really does a job in this essay to distance himself from previous philosophies of the Absolute. Philosophy, Badiou claims, has often fallen into error where it attempts to posit itself as a legitimate truth procedure, and in this way becomes like an art, or science, or politics, etc; but philosophy is none of these things. Rather, philosophy is the supra-procedural apparatus by which we should carry out truth procedures in art, science, politics, etc. Philosophy's primary goal, Badiou seems to suggest, is to fix the place of Truth as a void. This void is not ontological, however (i.e. not a void of being); it is operational. Badiou claims that wherever philosophy has tried to address this void as ontological, it has hence posited itself as a truth procedure, and has thus fallen into error, or disaster:
"Nietzsche's poet-philosopher; Husserl's vow to make philosophy a rigorous science; Pascal and Kierkegaard's wish to see philosophy as intense existence; and Plato's naming of the philosopher-king: all are as many intra-philosophical schemes of the permanent possibility of disaster. These schemas are all governed by the filling-in of the void that sustains the exercise of the pincers of Truth.
"A disaster, in philosophical thought, is in the making whenever philosophy presents itself as being not a seizing of truths but a situation of truth."
So, to get back to Grant's comment: Badiou would disregard such an approach because it hinges on the possibility of a multiplicity of truths, and all of them negative truths at that, i.e. meanings/values generated differentially through the play of language games. Philosophy does have the power, Badiou claims, to penetrate "beyond" language and meaning, to arrive at a logically sound Truth about the Real. It errs when it posits itself as a situation of this Truth, which he charges most philosophy of the past several centuries as having done. What philosophy should strive to do instead is create an operational apparatus (in Badiou's whole complex theory this can be achieved through mathematics) by which truth procedures such as art, science, politics, and even love can be effective.
tl;dr Badiou disagrees with Grant, and I don't know where I stand. As usual.
zabu of nΩd;10378630 said:
I've been thinking more about this lately, and while I still believe that in the ultimate course of history, different paradigms, epistemes, etc. will have different conceptions of reality or "being-in-the-world", I think that individuals living within those periods will be hardpressed to see their relation to the world as being conditioned or mediated by things like language and culture. We see this all the time today.
That said, it doesn't mean that people should just ignore the effects of our limited apperception of the world; however, if a sizable group, taking these limitations into account, were to somehow participate in an event of true philosophical rigor, I believe the common understanding drawn from its conclusion might suffice as a kind of "grand conclusion about the nature of reality."
This leads me into your next comment:
zabu of nΩd;10378630 said:
This attitude could be said to fit within a branch of 20th-century analytic philosophy known as pragmatism. Pragmatism draws a lot of influence from Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, even occasionally Foucault, and puts extraordinary emphasis on conceptual relativity, empiricism, and the idea that all discourses/arguments/discussions essentially boil down to language games. Our best practical approach, therefore, is to try and understand the language games, the instruments we use, the concepts, so as to better understand and facilitate our communicative faculties.
Coincidentally, I just read an essay by Alain Badiou that challenges this approach. Badiou accuses it of sophistry and claims that the current situation of analytic (and even much of continental) philosophy relies too much on the historical conditioning of philosophy up unto this point in time. He writes:
"For Nietzsche, as for Heidegger, all thought that claims to be philosophical must first of all be evaluated in a historical assemblage (montage); the mainspring of this historical assemblage is to be found with the Greeks; and the game is played, the consignment is sent, in what happens between the Presocratics and Plato."
Badiou calls for a radical breaking of philosophy from what he calls "historicism." This is difficult for me to accept, since I see history (or at least the contingency of historical moments) as the primary conditioner of any cultural milieu. However, I also see where Badiou is coming from: he wants to salvage philosophy as a genuine and legitimate search for the Absolute, for Truth, and his theoretical system is an attempt to provide the method for doing that.
On the surface, this might seem like a pseudo-totalitarian attempt at securing Truth based on whatever fallacious appeal might be at hand; but Badiou really does a job in this essay to distance himself from previous philosophies of the Absolute. Philosophy, Badiou claims, has often fallen into error where it attempts to posit itself as a legitimate truth procedure, and in this way becomes like an art, or science, or politics, etc; but philosophy is none of these things. Rather, philosophy is the supra-procedural apparatus by which we should carry out truth procedures in art, science, politics, etc. Philosophy's primary goal, Badiou seems to suggest, is to fix the place of Truth as a void. This void is not ontological, however (i.e. not a void of being); it is operational. Badiou claims that wherever philosophy has tried to address this void as ontological, it has hence posited itself as a truth procedure, and has thus fallen into error, or disaster:
"Nietzsche's poet-philosopher; Husserl's vow to make philosophy a rigorous science; Pascal and Kierkegaard's wish to see philosophy as intense existence; and Plato's naming of the philosopher-king: all are as many intra-philosophical schemes of the permanent possibility of disaster. These schemas are all governed by the filling-in of the void that sustains the exercise of the pincers of Truth.
"A disaster, in philosophical thought, is in the making whenever philosophy presents itself as being not a seizing of truths but a situation of truth."
So, to get back to Grant's comment: Badiou would disregard such an approach because it hinges on the possibility of a multiplicity of truths, and all of them negative truths at that, i.e. meanings/values generated differentially through the play of language games. Philosophy does have the power, Badiou claims, to penetrate "beyond" language and meaning, to arrive at a logically sound Truth about the Real. It errs when it posits itself as a situation of this Truth, which he charges most philosophy of the past several centuries as having done. What philosophy should strive to do instead is create an operational apparatus (in Badiou's whole complex theory this can be achieved through mathematics) by which truth procedures such as art, science, politics, and even love can be effective.
tl;dr Badiou disagrees with Grant, and I don't know where I stand. As usual.
